Analysis for the full set of strategies
In the main text, we have considered the subset of five most reasonable strategies, COMP, C, D, FAKE and FREE. Some other strategies have been omitted for the sake of exposition.
Our reasoning was that those who propose commitments at a cost should cooperate because otherwise (i.e. they defect, thus may also incur the compensation cost) they are worse than the corresponding defectors. Furthermore, those who will cooperate (with or without commitments, i.e. C and COMP) when playing the PD should accept commitments when being asked to because cooperation is their default choice then and a positive compensation is guaranteed plus that they do not have to pay the cost.
Here, in order to achieve a full account of the role of the commitment proposal mechanism for the evolution of cooperation in the one-shot Prisoner's Dilemma, we include all possible strategies (that are not conditional on the existence of a deal as is the case for FREE) given the option to propose commitments.
Let us assume a strategy can be denoted by three components, XY Z, where
• X defines whether the strategy proposes (P) or does not propose (N) a commitment before an interaction (X ∈ {P, N }).
• Y defines what is the move, cooperates (C) or defects (D), in the current interaction (Y ∈ {C, D}).
• Z defines if the strategy accepts (A) or rejects (R) a commitment deal when being asked to (Z ∈ {A, R}).
There are thus eight possible such strategies. The strategy COMP is identical to PCA, that is, proposes a commitment deal before an interaction, cooperates in the current interaction, and accepts when being proposed to commit. Similarly, the strategy C is identical to NCA, FAKE is identical to NDA and D is identical to NDR. Together with FREE, the average payoff matrix of the nine strategies become
From the payoff matrix it becomes clear that PCR is dominated by COMP and NCR is dominated by C (as long as δ + S ≥ 0) (a strategy B is dominated by another strategy A if choosing B never gives a better outcome than choosing A, whatever strategy their opponent uses). We hence, as in the main text, assume that those who will/intend to cooperate would never reject a commitment proposal. That is, PCR and NCR can explicitly be removed from the population and the matrix above. In the reduced matrix PDA is dominated by FAKE, and then after removing PDA, PDR is dominated by D (in both dominance cases it holds as long as δ ≥ T − P − ; in the absence of FREE they always holds). Note that the latter dominance holds even in the non-reduced original matrix whenever δ ≥ T − and P ≥ 0. Hence, we can, again as in the main text, assume that those will/intend to defect would not propose commitments.
The following figure clarifies further our results. In Figure S1 with her co-player. If the co-player defected she will punish the co-player with a penalty (δ) while suffering a personal cost . Thus when playing against either a pure cooperator C or pure defector D in the PD game, the following payoff matrix is used: Figure S2 shows that, differently from the commitment model where is the essential/decisive parameter, the effective punishment δ increases with the cost of punishment. Moreover, to reach the same level of cooperation as in the commitment model a much more severe punishment 5 (δ ≈ 14) is required for an equivalently small cost ( ≈ 0.05).
Sharing strategies
Combing all five earlier strategies, the commitment sharing proposer and the three new sharing strategies, the average payoff matrix now becomes
Using the Equation (5) in the main text, we obtain that COMS is risk-dominant against all defectors and free-riders (i.e. D, FAKE, FAKS, FREE and FRES) if
As a consequence, the previous conditions are simplified to: 
